Abstract: The standard framework in which economists evaluate environmental policies is cost-bene t analysis, so policy debates usually focus on the expected ows of costs and bene ts, or on the choice of discount rate. But this can bemisleading when there is uncertainty over future outcomes, when there are irreversibilities, and when policy adoption can be delayed. This paper shows how two kinds of uncertainty | over the future costs and bene ts of reduced environmental degradation, and over the evolution of an ecosystem | interact with two kinds of irreversibilities | sunk costs associated with an environmental regulation, and sunk bene ts" of avoided environmental degradation | to a ect optimal policy timing and design.
1 Introduction.
Recent studies have begun to examine the implications of irreversibility and uncertainty for environmental policy, at times drawing upon the theory of irreversible investment decisions. 4 Kolstad 1992 developed a three-period model to study the implications of costbene t uncertainty for the adoption of an emissions-reducing policy that can involve sunk costs. In his model, the accumulated stock of pollutant is permanent. Emissions can be reduced in the rst or second periods, and between these periods there is a reduction in uncertainty over the net bene ts from a lower stock of pollutant. He shows that if there is no sunk cost of policy adoption, the faster is the rate of learning, the lower is rst-period emissions. This is a version of the result of Arrow and Fisher 1974 and Henry 1974 ; because the stock of pollutant is permanent, society should pollute less now if there is uncertainty over the future damage from the pollutant. But Kolstad goes on to show that if the cost of policy adoption is at least partly sunk, the e ect of uncertainty on the initial level of emissions is ambiguous. 5 Hendricks 1992 developed a continuous-time model of global warming similar to the one in this paper. As I do, he studied the timing of policies to irreversibly reduce emissions, allowing for a partially irreversible accumulation of the pollutant. The particular form of uncertainty he considers is over a parameter linking the global mean temperature increase to the atmospheric GHG concentration, and he allows for learning by assuming that the uncertainty over this parameter falls over some xed period of time. He focuses on how the speed of learning a ects the timing of policy adoption. 6 warming, see Cline 1992 and Solow 1991 . Similar uncertainties exist with respect to acid rain. For example, we are unable to accurately predict how particular levels of NOX emissions will a ect the future acidity of lakes and rivers, or the viability of the sh populations that live in them. 4 For an introduction to and overview of the literature on irreversible investment, see Dixit 1992 and Pindyck 1991 . For a more detailed treatment, see Dixit and Pindyck 1994 . 5 Kolstad 1996 also obtains this general result in the context of a two-period model. In related work, Hammitt, Lempert, and Schlesinger 1992 use a two-period model to study implications of uncertainty for adoption of policies to reduce GHG emissions, and show that under some conditions it may be desirable to wait for additional information. Kolstad 1994 and Kelly and Kolstad 1998 also examined GHG emission policy in the context of a growth model with uncertainty and learning about the value of an unknown parameter. Kolstad nds that temporary emission-reduction policies dominate permanent ones, and Kelly and Kolstad characterize the rate of learning in a Bayesian context and show its implications for policy. 6 Although he did not do so, Hendricks could also use his model to study the implications of the degree 3 Finally, related studies by Chao 1995 and Narain and Fisher 1998 deserve mention. Chao examines randomly arriving catastrophic damage from GHG emissions, where the probability of arrival is increasing the emissions rate. Narain and Fisher also develop a model with both ecological and economic irreversibilities. The uncertainty is with respect to the Poisson arrival of a catastrophe" that drives utility permanently to zero, with a mean arrival rate that is an increasing function of the stock of pollutant. Hence the probability of a catastrophe" over any period can be reduced by i n v esting in pollution reduction. This kind of uncertainty has a very limited e ect | it simply increases the e ective discount rate.
In this paper, I assume that information arrives continually, but there always remains uncertainty o v er the future evolution of key environmental variables, and over the future costs and bene ts of policy adoption. I focus on how irreversibilities and uncertainty interact in a ecting the timing and design of policy. The next section begins by laying out the basic analytical framework, and shows how policy design and timing can be treated as an optimal stopping problem. I consider policies, which entail a ow of sunk costs, to reduce emissions of a pollutant which accumulates. In Section 3, I consider a model with economic uncertainty, i.e., there is uncertainty o v er the future social cost of any given stock of pollutant. I rst consider the case in which policy adoption implies reducing emissions to zero, and then the case in which the size of the reduction can be chosen optimally at the time of adoption. In addition, I examine the policy timing problem for both linear and convex economic bene t functions. In Section 4, I allow for gradual emission reductions, again in the presence of economic uncertainty. Section 5 examines the implications of ecological uncertainty by allowing the evolution of the stock of pollutant to bestochastic. Section 6 concludes.
of irreversibility o f e n vironmental damage, by v arying the parameter that describes the rate of natural GHG removal from the atmosphere. Conrad 1992 also developed a continuous-time model of emission control, in which the social cost of pollution is a quadratic function of the stock of pollutant, with a coe cient that uctuates as a geometric Brownian motion. The linear-quadratic structure implies that emissions will be zero a maximum rate if this coe cient exceeds is below a critical value. He shows that this critical value is a declining function of volatility. However, the only irreversibility is with respect to the stock of pollutant, so the results are along the line of those in Henry and Arrow and Fisher. 2 Analytical Framework.
In order to get at the basic issues and obtain results that are reasonably easy to interpret, I introduce a model that captures the basic stock externality associated with many environmental problems in as simple a way as possible, while still allowing for key sources of uncertainty. Let M t be a state variable that summarizes one or more stocks of environmental pollutants. For example, M might b e the average concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere, the acidity level of a lake, forest, or the concentrations of a mix of pollutants that make up urban smog. Let E t bea ow variable that controls M t , e.g., the rate of CO 2 or SO 2 emissions. I will assume that absent some policy intervention, E t follows an exogenous trajectory. Ignoring uncertainty for the time being, the evolution of M t is given by:
where is the natural rate at which the stock of pollutant dissipates over time. 7 I will assume that the ow of social cost associated with the stock v ariable M t is speci ed by a function BM t ; t , where t shifts over time, perhaps stochastically, to re ect changes in tastes and technologies. For example, if M is the GHG concentration, shifts in might re ect the development of new agricultural techniques that reduce the social cost of a higher M, or alternatively, demographic changes that raise the cost.
One would generally expect BM t ; t t o b e c o n v ex in M t at least when M t is su ciently large. However, for simplicity I will initially assume that B is linear in M, i.e., BM t ; t = , t M t : 2 7 This is a simpli ed version of a basic di usion model used by Nordhaus 1991 to compare costs and bene ts of policies to reduce greenhouse gas GHG emissions. That model supplements eqn. 1 with an adjustment process for temperature:
where T is the increase in mean temperature from GHGs, M is atmospheric GHG concentration from industrial activity, and is a delay parameter. Associated with a higher T is a global economic cost resulting from, among other things, land loss due to a rising sea level, and reduced agricultural output due to climate change. I am simplifying things by dropping the variable T and associating an economic cost directly with M. Also, note that at this point eqn. 1 is deterministic; later I will introduce ecological uncertainty b y generalizing this equation so that M follows a controlled di usion process Note that uncertainty o v er the future costs and bene ts of policy adoption can be introduced by letting follow a stochastic process.
The implications of uncertainty and irreversibility are easiest to see by focusing on policies that are introduced at a speci c point in time, and that have a long-term impact on the evolution of E t , although I will also consider policies that are introduced gradually. Consider a policy introduced at time T that changes the evolution of E t for t T. It would presumably impose a ow of costs on society, some portion of which will be sunk. I denote the present value at time T of the expected ow o f sunk costs associated with this policy by KE T ; ! , where ! is a vector of policy characteristics. For example, ! might describe an absolute reduction in E t , or a reduction in the expected rate of growth of E t . 8 Initially, I will assume that policy adoption involves a once-and-for-all reduction in E t to some new and permanent level E 1 , with 0 E 1 E 0 . I will also begin by assuming that the social cost of adopting this policy is completely sunk, and its present value at the time of adoption is a convex function of the size of the emission reduction, which I denote by KE 1 . 9 The policy objective is to maximize: 3 subject to eqn. 1. Here,T is the in general, unknown time that the policy is adopted, E 0 , E 1 is the amount that emissions are reduced, E 0 denotes the expectation at time t = 0 , and r is the discount rate. Thus we h a v e an optimal stopping problem | we m ust determine when it is optimal to commit to spending K to reduce E t , given the possibly stochastic dependence of M t on E t , and given the stochastic evolution of t .
3 Economic Uncertainty.
I i n troduce economic uncertainty b y allowing the social bene t function to shift stochastically over time. I will begin by assuming that policy adoption implies reducing E from its initial level E 0 to zero. I also assume for now that the cost of emissions reduction as a linear function of the size of the reduction, and BM t ; t is a linear function of M t . Hence if it is optimal to reduce E at all, it is indeed optimal to reduce it to zero. Later I will make the cost of reducing emissions a convex function of the size of the reduction, and let the size of the reduction beapolicy choice variable. I introduce uncertainty by letting follow a geometric Brownian motion:
This means the current ow of social cost from a level of pollutant M t is known, but the future ow of social cost is always uncertain, and the amount of uncertainty grows with the time horizon. Thus we learn about the social cost of pollution as time passes, but the ow of social cost in the future will always be unknown. Of course one might argue that for some environmental problems, most or all of the uncertainty over social costs will eventually be resolved. In e ect, this means that in eqn. 4 will fall over time. For problems such as global warming, acid rain, and species extinction, there is little evidence of such a resolution of uncertainty as opposed to a continuing evolution of our assessment of social costs. Suppose the cost of reducing E from E 0 to zero is given by K = kE 0 . Wewant a policy adoption rule that maximizes the net present value function of eqn. 3 subject to eqn. 4 for the evolution of , and eqn. 1 for the evolution of M. This problem can be solved using dynamic programming by de ning a net present value function for each of two regions. Let W N ;Mdenote the value function for the no-adopt" region in which E t = E 0 , and let W A ;Mdenote the value function for the adopt" region in which E t = 0. Here, is the critical value of at or above which the policy should be adopted. Condition 7 re ects the fact that if is ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Condition 8 is the value matching condition; it simply says that when = and society exercises its option to adopt the policy, it incurs a sunk cost K = kE 0 and hence receives the net payo W A ; M , K . Condition 9 is the smooth pasting condition;" if adoption at is indeed optimal, the derivative o f t h e v alue function must becontinuous at . These di erential equations and associated boundary conditions have the solution: Note from eqn. 10 that W N has three components. The rst term on the right-hand side of 10 is the value of the option to adopt the policy at some time in the future. The second term is the present value of the ow of social cost resulting from the current stock of pollutant, M. The current stock, M, decays at the rate , while has an expected rate of growth , so the present value is ,M=r+ , . The third term is the present value of the ow of social cost that would result if emissions continued at the rate E 0 forever.
The present value of the ow of cost from emissions E 0 now is E 0 =r+ , , but the present value of of the ow of cost from emissions E 0 now and in all future periods is E 0 =r+ , r , . This last component of social cost is reduced by the value of the option to reduce emissions, i.e., the rst term. Once the policy has been adopted, E = 0 and the value function W A applies. Then the only social cost is from the current stock of pollutant.
There are still two unknowns, the constant A and critical value at which the policy should be adopted, and they are determined from boundary conditions 8 and 9: r, r + , = k :
The left-hand side of eqn. 17 is just the present value of the ow of social cost from one extra unit of emissions now and throughout the future adjusted for the absorption rate , and the right-hand side is the cost of permanently reducing emissions by one unit. Hence eqn. 17 is a standard cost-bene t calculation. We can rewrite the equation in terms of a critical value that triggers policy adoption:
= kr , r + , = :
When there is uncertainty, this critical level is simply increased by the factor = ,1.
Note that an increase in implies a decrease in and hence an increase in . The more uncertainty there is over the future social cost of the pollutant, the greater is the incentive to wait rather than adopt the policy now, and hence the greater must be the current cost in order to trigger adoption. An increase in the discount rate r increases the value of the option to adopt the policy and thus also increases . The cost, K, is paid in the future when the policy is adopted; hence an increase in r implies a greater reduction in the present value of that cost, so that the option to adopt is worth more but it should be exercised later. An increase in , the rate of depreciation" of the stock of pollutant, also increases ; a higher value of implies that the environmental damage from emissions is more reversible, so that the sunk bene t of adopting the policy now rather than waiting is lower.
Also, observe that an increase in the initial rate of emissions E 0 leaves unchanged but increases the value of society's option to adopt the emission-reducing policy. The reason is that K = kE 0 ,so that is independent of E 0 , and A increases linearly with E 0 . Finally, is also independent of M. Because BM;is linear in M so that the value functions W N and W A are linear in M, any given level of M t implies the same reduction in social welfare if the policy is adopted at time t as it does if the policy is not adopted. Hence W N ;M,W A ;Mis independent of M, and so is .
We can frame this timing problem in terms of a comparison of the opportunity costs of The rst term on the right-hand side of 18 is the direct cost of current adoption. The second term is value of the option to adopt, and since adoption implies killing" this option, it is an opportunity cost of current adoption. The last term is the present value of the additional ow of social cost from continued emissions, and thus is an opportunity bene t" of current adoption. Since and W , W 0 0, the direct cost and opportunity cost outweigh this opportunity bene t, and adoption should be delayed.
Note that as the model is currently structured, it would never be optimal to reduce emissions by a n ything less than 100 percent assuming it would optimal to reduce emissions at all. The reason is that with K = kE 0 , the value of the option to adopt the policy, A , is linear in E 0 , so that W N and W A are linear in M and E 0 . Shortly we will make K a nonlinear function of the reduction in emissions, and examine policies that involve a one-time partial reduction in emissions, as well as gradual incremental reductions.
A Numerical Example.
A numerical example will help to explore the characteristics of the solution. Suppose that = 0 so that the social cost perunit of M is expected to remain constant, r = :04, = :02, = :20, = 1, E 0 = 300,000 tons peryear, 0 = $20 per ton, and k = 6667 so that K = kE 0 =$2 billion. Then, from eqns. 12, 13, and 14, = 2.0, A = 1,953,125, and = $32 per ton. Hence at the current value of 0 = 20, the policy should not be adopted. However, the value of the option to adopt it in the future, A , is $0.78 billion. The policy should be adopted when reaches $32 per ton; at that point A = $2.0 billion, and boundary conditions 8 and 9 are satis ed. Figure 3 shows Figure 3 shows as a function of for = .01 and .02. Note that rises sharply with . This is partly due to the fact that we h a v e framed the policy problem as an all-or-nothing proposition, but it nonetheless suggests that assessing uncertainty o v er the future costs and bene ts of emission reduction may b e particulary critical to the policy adoption decision.
As mentioned in the Introduction, environmental policy debates often focus on the discount rate. However, for many environmental problems, the range of plausible discount rates is much smaller than the range of plausible degrees of uncertainty. It is therefore useful to examine the sensitivity of to both r and . Table 1 shows these semi-elasticities, along with , for di erent values of r and . In all cases, = 0, = .02, K = $2 billion, and E 0 = 300,000 tons per year. Note that a .01 change in r results in approximately the same percentage change in as does a .1 change in . But this does not mean that the discount rate is a more important determinant of environmental policy. First, plausible values of the real discount rate are con ned to a small range | for analyses of global climate change, for example, between .02 and .05. But plausible values for or the standard deviation of other stochastic state variables can fall within a much larger range. Second, most traditional cost-bene t analyses of environmental policy are done by implicitly assuming that = 0. Hence even if the correct value of is only .2 or .3, just accounting for uncertainty can matter a lot. We n o w consider policies that only partially reduce emissions. We will assume that the sunk cost of the policy is a quadratic function of the amount that emissions are reduced:
19 where E 0 , E 1 is the amount of the reduction, and k 1 ; k 2 0. Thus the cost of a 1-unit permanent reduction in E is kE = , dK=dE 1 = k 1 + 2 k 2 E 0 , E 1 . We must again nd a rule in the form of a critical value for the optimal timing of policy adoption, but now we must also determine the optimal size of the reduction, i.e., the optimal value of E 1 . Given , w e can nd E from eqn. 24. It is easy to con rm that as increases so that decreases, will increase and E will fall. However, we must account for the fact that E must lie between 0 and E 0 .
Let max denote the value of for which E = 0. From eqn. 24, we see that max = k 1 = +2 k 2 E 0 = . Hence E 0 implies that max = k 1 = +2 k 2 E 0 = , or equivalently, that 2 + k 1 =k 2 E 0 . 11 If is su ciently large so that 2 + k 1 =k 2 E 0 , eqns. 25 and 26 will no longer apply. Instead, E is constrained to bezero and so is no longer a choice variable. In that case the solution to the optimal timing problem is again given by eqns. 13 and 14 with K = k 1 E 0 + k 2 E 2 0 . Also, we must have E E 0 , but this will always bethe case; observe from eqns. 24 and 25 that E E 0 for any 2. 12 Figure 3 .1 illustrates this. First, it shows the conventionally calculated NPV from policy adoption, when E 1 can bechosen optimally according to eqn. 24. That NPV is equal to:
This NPV is a quadratic function of , and applies for values of for which 0 E E 0 ; in this range, the NPV is increasing in . Also shown is the value of the option to adopt an emission-reducing policy, which is equal to A . The critical value is at the point where the option value A is just tangent to this NPV, i.e., where the value matching and smooth pasting conditions 21 and 22 hold. Figure 3 .1 shows this solution for the following numerical example: E 0 = 300; 000 tons per year, k 1 = 5000 and k 2 = :0055 so that the cost of reducing E to zero would beabout $2 billion, = :045, and as in the earlier example, = 0 , r = : 04, = :02, and = 1 . In this case, a policy is never adopted for min = 1 2 even if is reduced to zero, and max = 20. For = :045, = 6:8, so that = 17, i.e., max so that E 0. From eqn. 24, we see that E = 110; 606 tons peryear.
The amount that emissions are reduced depends on the degree of uncertainty over the future bene ts from a reduction, and on other parameters. Figure 3 .1 shows the dependence of both E and on for this numerical example. In the gure, is multiplied by 10 4 so that it can beplotted with E on the same scale. When = 0 , the standard NPV rule applies; the policy should be adopted if 12. If is just slightly greater than 12, the policy is adopted but emissions are reduced only very slightly. The reason is that in this numerical example, = 0 , so that if = 0 , cannot rise in the future. As is increased, the critical value also increases, and E falls. Note that for : 063, E = 0 , so that is given by eqn. 14 with k 1 E 0 + k 2 E 2 0 substituted for K rather than eqn. 25. We can likewise determine the dependence of and E on other parameters from eqns. 14, 24, and 25. For example, a higher initial level of emissions, E 0 , does not a ect the critical value , but does imply a commensurately higher ending level E so that the size of the reduction is unchanged. Also, an increase in k 1 increases , but an increase in k 2 has no e ect on , although it increases E .
Convex Bene t Function.
We h a v e assumed that the bene t function BM; is linear in M, which makes the optimal policy rules independent of M. This was convenient, but for most environmental problems, the damage from a pollutant is like to rise more than proportionally with the stock of the pollutant. Then the optimal policy rule will depend on the stock. To explore this, we again make the cost of an emission reduction linear in the size of the reduction, and assume emissions must bereduced to zero once a policy is adopted, so that K = kE 0 . But now we let the bene t function BM;bequadratic in M:
The value functions W N ;Mand W A ;M for the no-adopt" and adopt" regions will again satisfy the Bellman equations 5 and 6, but with the term ,M replaced by ,M 2 in each equation. Boundary conditions 7 9 also apply. The critical value now depends on M; a higher value of M implies a higher marginal social cost from additional emissions, and therefore a lower value of at which it is optimal to begin reducing emissions. For the same reason, a higher M increases the value of the option to reduce emissions. The rising marginal social cost of emissions likewise implies that the higher is the current emission level, E 0 , the lower is . As before, a higher cost of emission reduction, k, and a higher decay rate, , lead to a higher value of .
Most important, uncertainty a ects the optimal adoption rule the same way it does when B;M is linear in M. The parameter a ects through the multiplier , 1= , and is given by the same equation 12 as before. Hence making the bene t function convex in M a ects the optimal policy adoption rule, but it does not a ect the way that rule depends on uncertainty o v er the future social costs of pollution. The critical value for the certainty case is multiplied by the same factor as before.
4 Gradual Emission Reductions.
In the preceding section we assumed that there would beonly one opportunity t o adopt an emissions-reducing policy. This is not terribly unrealistic; given the political di culties of reaching a concensus and introducing a major new environmental policy, it is unlikely that regulations could berevised frequently. On the other hand, assuming that such regulations could never be revised once a new policy is in place is extreme. Rather than making arbitrary assumptions about the allowed frequency of policy change or making assumptions about menu costs" of policy change so that the frequency is endogenous, I will assume the opposite extreme | that the level of emissions can bereduced gradually and continuously.
Comparing the optimal policy in this case with that from the preceding section provides insight i n to how the frequency with which regulations can beintroduced or changed a ects the optimal timing and design of policy. In this section I will again assume that the cost of any incremental emission reductions is completely sunk, which is equivalent to assuming that emissions can only be reduced. This assumption can easily be relaxed by making the cost of emission reductions only partly sunk. Policy makers must observe both and the stock variable M, and decide when and by how much to mandate emissions reductions in response to changes in these variables.
For this problem to beof interest, either the bene t function or the cost function must beconvex. I will assume that the bene t function B;Mis linear in and M, and that the cost of the policy is a quadratic function of the amount that emissions are reduced, as in eqn. 19. Thus the cost of a 1-unit reduction in E is K = k 1 + 2 k 2 E 0 , E 1 . Letting m 1 = k 1 + 2 k 2 E 0 and m 2 = 2 k 2 , the cost of an incremental reduction is:
32 Since B t = , t M t , the payo ow from a small reduction in the stock of pollutant, M t , is just B t = , t M t . If emissions are reduced incrementally by an amount E at time t = 0 , the corresponding change in M t is M t = , E h 1 , e , t i ; 33 so the social bene t from an incremental reduction in emissions at time t is:
where r , r + , . Given the current t , we must determine how far to reduce emissions initially, and how to make further reductions in response to changes in . This is analogous to the incremental investment and capacity c hoice problem in Pindyck 1988. Suppose E t = E currently, and let WE; ;Mbethe value function given this E, and given and M. Let F bethe value of society's option to permanently reduce E by one unit. Note that the cost of exercising that option is F E; ;M + K E , and the payo is W . Then To i n terpret 40, note that m 1 ,m 2 E= is the amortized sunk cost of an incremental reduction in emissions, normalized by the absorption rate . Since B;M is linear, in the absence of uncertainty it would beoptimal to reduce emissions to the point where this amortized sunk cost is just equal to , the social cost per period of an incremental unit of the stock of pollutant, M. With uncertainty, the threshold exceeds this amortized sunk cost by the multiple = ,1. Also, note that as E is reduced, rises and a falls. Depending on the initial value of , it may be optimal to initially reduce emissions by some large amount, and then later reduce emissions gradually when increases and hits the boundary . For any value of E, is increased if increases, and is decreased if the decay rate increases. Finally, given E, we can determine the optimal emissions level E .
Monte Carlo Simulation.
In this model, uncertainty a ects the initial level of mandated emissions reductions, and it also a ects the maximum allowed emissions level over time. I used a numerical example and ran a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the magnitude of these e ects and its dependence on . In this example, the initial emissions level is E 0 = 300; 000 tons per year, the cost function parameters are k 1 = 5000 and k 2 = :0055 so that the cost of reducing E from 300,000 tons peryear to zero would beabout $2 billion, and r = :04, = :02, and = 1 . I set = :01, so that even absent uncertainty, emissions will gradually be reduced as increases. I varied from 0 to .15, in increments of .005. For each value of , I ran 10,000 simulations of the evolution of and the corresponding optimal emissions level E . Figure 4 shows the results of this Monte Carlo simulation for the mean optimal emissions level initially, and after 20 years. Note that when there is no uncertainty i.e., = 0, emissions are initially reduced from 300,000 to about 70,000 tons per year, and then reduced gradually to zero as and the corresponding social cost of pollution rises. As is increased, the initial allowed emissions level increases, re ecting the value of waiting. Emissions are still reduced over time although reductions occur stochastically when 0, but the mean value of E after 20 years also increases with . Figure 4 shows the mean and median times until the optimal emissions level has been reduced to zero. Both the mean and median times should increase monotonically with , because increases in increase the threshold E for every value of E. In the gure, the mean time decreases for : 13, but this is an artifact of the Monte Carlo simulation. In each run, the model was simulated for 1000 years, and for large values of , there will be runs for which it takes longer than this for E to reach zero. In addition, the number of runs at this tail of the distribution is very small. Note that because the distribution of the time until zero emissions is asymmetric, the mean time will exceed the median time for all 0. The di erence between the mean time and median time illustrates an important aspect of the e ects of uncertainty. There i s a v alue of waiting i.e., reducing emissions less than would be the case otherwise because of the possibility that will not increase as much as expected. For 0, there are indeed realizations in which it takes a very long time for to grow to the point where eliminating emissions is justi ed.
Ecological Uncertainty.
So far, the only form of uncertainty that we have considered has been over the parameter that shifts the bene t function B. In this section, I will assume that remains xed, but that there is uncertainty over the evolution of M. Speci cally, I replace eqn. 1 by: dM = E, Mdt + dz: 42
Thus even if the trajectory for E t were known, future values of M would be uncertain and normally distributed. 13 For uncertainty of this kind to have any e ect on policy timing or design, the bene t function B;Mmust beconvex in M. The reason is that if this function were linear in M, stochastic uctuations in M would have no e ect on the expected marginal social return from reductions in E, and thus could not a ect the optimal policy. This would be true even if the cost of emission reduction, KE, were a nonlinear function of the size of the reduction.
We will therefore assume that the bene t function is quadratic in M, i.e., BM;= This solution has properties that we w ould expect. Note in particular that @M =@K 0, @M =@r 0, @M =@ 0, and @M =@ 0. Thus stochastic uctuations in M create an incentive to delay policy adoption. As a numerical example, and for comparison to results shown below for the more general case of 0, we will set r = :04, K = 4, E 0 = .3, = 1, and = .002. Then, if = 0 , the policy should beadopted immediately for any value of M. However, if = 1 , the policy should only beadopted when M M = 6 : 74, and when = 4 , the policy should be adopted when M M = Table 2 shows the critical value M for values of ranging from 0.3 to 4.0, and for equal to 0 and .02. The table shows that M increases with , but it also shows how M increases with . A higher implies a lower or negative rate of drift for M | emissions are more reversible, so the present v alue of the ow of social cost for any current v alue of M is lower, and a higher M is needed to justify the sunk cost of policy adoption.
6 Conclusions.
I have focussed largely on a one-time policy adoption to reduce emissions of a pollutant. If the policy imposes sunk costs on society, and if it can bedelayed, there is an opportunity cost of adopting the policy now rather than waiting for more information. This is analogous 25 to the incentive to wait that arises with irreversible investment decisions. In the case of environmental policy, h o w ever, this opportunity cost must be balanced against the opportunity bene t" of early action | a reduced stock of pollutant that might decay only slowly, imposing irreversible or nearly irreversible costs on society.
In the simple models presented in this paper, an increase in uncertainty, whether over future costs and bene ts of reduced emissions, or over the evolution of the stock of pollutant, leads to a higher threshold for policy adoption. This is because policy adoption involves a sunk cost associated with a discrete reduction in the entire trajectory of future emissions, whereas inaction over any small time interval only involves continued emissions over that interval. This is true even for gradual emission reductions | a small reduction is a reduction in the entire trajectory. Hence in my framework greater uncertainty always leads to greater delay, although the e ect is smaller the smaller is the decay rate, .
The validity of this result depends on the extent to which e n vironmental policy is indeed irreversible, in the sense of involving commitments to future ows of sunk costs. It seems to me that this kind of irreversibility is often an inherent aspect of environmental policy, both for policies that are in place e.g., the Clean Air Act, and for policies under debate e.g., GHG emission reductions. Nonetheless, the assumption of complete irreversibility made in this paper i.e., all costs of policy adoption are sunk may beextreme. Richer models are needed to explore the implications of relaxing this assumption somewhat.
In these models. economic and ecological uncertainty were treated separately. Ideally, we w ould like to allow both and M to evolve stochastically at the same time. This can be done, but then the value functions W A ;Mand W N ;Mwill satisfy more complicated partial di erential equations that must be solved numerically. Solution methods for such models are discussed in Pindyck 1996, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
